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Note
"Good Faith" and Confirmation of Chapter 13
Composition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal
I.

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Code' has been touted
as offering "instant solutions" that can stop "repossessions[,]
law suits[,] foreclosure[,] shut offs[,] harrassment[,J" and
"judgements" 2 faced by insolvent debtors. The liberalized access to Chapter 133 and its substantial advantages over straight
bankruptcy 4 have indeed produced a significant increase in
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. 1I 1979). The new Code repeals the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended by the Chandler Act,
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). Congressional interest in bankruptcy reform was
sparked by a 1971 Brookings Report. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH,BANKRUPTcY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 4-6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROOKINGS REPORT]. See also S. ENZER, R. DEBRIGARD & F. LAzAR, SOME CONSIDERATIONS
CONCERNING BANKRUPTCY REFORM 7-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. ENZER];
Bare, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,47 TENN.L. REV. 501, 503-04 (1980). In
response, Congress formed the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States to study and draft proposed substitute legislation. Merrick,
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 56 DEN. L.J. 585, 588-89 (1979).
See generally REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUpTCY LAWS OF THE

UNrIED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., Pts. I & II (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted in 2 app. W. COLLER, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY I-I (15th ed. 1979). Between 1974 and 1978, Congress considered several compromise bills incorporating the ideas of the Commission Report, a counterproposal by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, H.R.
32 & S.235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and testimony submitted in various congressional hearings. See Klee, LegislativeHistory of the New Bankruptcy Law,
28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 944-46 (1979), reprinted in Preface to 2 app. W. CoLLIER,
supra, at V.
2. Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 13, 1980, § A, at 9, col. 2. Although individual
debtors can also discharge personal debts under either Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 701-766 (Supp. HI 1979), or Chapter 11, id. at §§ 1101-1174, Chapter 13 is the
best option for most individual debtors. A Chapter 11 reorganization is more
expensive and complicated than a Chapter 13 wage earner plan. See Merrick,
supra note 1, at 620. Chapter 13 offers benefits not available to debtors under
Chapter 7. See note 4 infra
3. Any individual with regular income is eligible for Chapter 13 relief, provided that his debts do not exceed the statutory limits. See note 25 infra.
4. Under Chapter 13, a debtor, in appropriate circumstances, can obtain
an extension of the period of repayment of his secured creditors while retaining possession of the collateral securing the loan and "cramming down" the secured portion of the creditor's claim to the actual value of the property. 11
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filings of wage earner plans. 5 More importantly, courts now

face two types of Chapter 13 plans that never arose under former Chapter XIi:6 plans that propose zero or nominal repayment of the claims of unsecured creditors 7 and plans that
propose discharge of debts that would not be dischargeable in
straight bankruptcy. 8
To rule on such plans, 9 courts have turned to the Code's requirement that debtor plans be "proposed in good faith"1O-a
vague requirement that is not clarified by legislative history or
prior case law." It is thus not surprising that courts have often
U.S.C. § 1325(a) (5) (A)-(B) (Supp. 11 1979). Under this "cram down" provision,
the debtor, with his creditor's approval, may reduce the creditor's secured interest in collateral to its present value, provided the creditor retains a lien on
the property. A debtor may thus keep the property while redeeming it under
the plan. If a secured creditor refuses to accept the plan, the debtor can discharge the debt by surrendering the collateral. Id. at § 1325 (a) (5) (C).
Furthermore, the Chapter 13 debtor can discharge his or her obligations to
unsecured creditors by paying little or nothing on these creditors' claims. Section 1325(a) (4) provides that unsecured creditors must receive at least as much
as they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation. In a case in which all the debtor's
assets are exempt, unsecured creditors would receive nothing in straight bankruptcy. Thus, no payments to these creditors would be required under this
test-also referred to as the "best interest of the creditors" test.
In addition, Chapter 13 enables the debtor to avoid the stigma of straight
bankruptcy. See H. JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT- THE CONSUMPTION OF GOVERN-

MENT SERVICES 114 (1969) (29% of the debtors in straight bankruptcy felt stigmatized by the experience).
Finally, when compared to Chapter 7, the discharge obtained in Chapter 13
is much broader, providing relief from all debts except alimony and child support. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (Supp. I11 1979) with id. at § 523(a). In
addition, a debtor is barred from refling in Chapter 7 for six years after a liquidation. Id. at § 727(a) (8). The six year bar does not apply to Chapter 13 plans
that both represent the debtor's "best effort" and repay 70% on allowed claims.
Id. at § 727(a) (9) (B) (i)-(ii).
5. Compare Table F2, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (1979) (indicating
that for the 12 month period ending June 30, 1979, 39,442 wage earner plans, out
of a total of 226,476 bankruptcy cases, were filed) with Table F2 BC, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (1980) (indicating that for the 9 month period ending
June 30, 1980, 47,458 wage earner plans, out of a total of 209,399 bankruptcy
cases, were filed).
6. Although creditors dissatisfied with the proposed dividend previously
could block a debtor's access to old Chapter XIII, creditors have no such veto
power under the new Code. See note 26 infra. In addition, the new Code provides that a debtor's plan may schedule debts for discharge that previously
were not dischargeable in old Chapter XIII, see note 27 infra, and currently are
barred from discharge in Chapter 7. See note 4 supra.
7. See, e.g., In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 258-59 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1980).
8. See, e.g., In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 347, 351 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va. 1980) (tort
debt held not dischargeable under zero payment Chapter 13 plan).
9. The statute provides that Chapter 13 plans must be confirmed by the
court See 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. I 1979).
10. Id. at § 1325(a) (3).
11. See 5 W. CoLLmR, COLIER ON BANHUprcy I 1325.01(C) (15th ed. 1979).
Some courts have endeavored to interpret the new good faith requirement by
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differed over the application of the good faith standard-many
courts hold that "good faith" requires some minimal percentage
of repayment,12 while others focus on either the debtor's ability
to repay13 or subjective intent14 as measures of "good faith."
Because of this unpredictability with respect to a given plan's
chance for confirmation, some debtors may be compelled to liquidate their assets in straight bankruptcy.' 5 Of course, the
same result usually occurs when a court denies confirmation of
a Chapter 13 plan as not in "good faith." Ironically, creditors
may be the ultimate losers in this process because Chapter 13
plans may offer more total debt repayment than could be
achieved through liquidation.16 Therefore, both creditors and
debtors would be better served by a clear, properly balanced,
and consistently applied standard of "good faith" in Chapter 13
proceedings.
This Note will briefly outline the history of Chapter 13
plans in order to demonstrate the significance of the good faith
requirement. It will then analyze the judicial treatment of
"good faith," exploring how the various "good faith" formulations affect debtors, creditors, the policies underlying bankruptcy reform, and the economics of the bankruptcy system.
Finally, this Note proposes that "good faith" should be interpreted to require only that a debtor's plan represents his or her
"best effort" to repay unsecured creditors, regardless of the actual quantum of repayment under the plan-confirmation
analogizing it to the requirements of the superseded Bankruptcy Act. See In re
Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 587 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980) (holding that "good faith" had
not been interpreted as requiring any minimum of payments under old Chapter XII, Chandler Act bf 1938, ch. 575 § 467, 52 Stat. 923, and thus confirmation
under the new Code should be denied "only in those cases in which there has
been an abuse of the provisions, purposes, or spirit" of the Bankruptcy Code).
But see In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63, 64-65 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ark.) (old Chapter X good
faith definition, Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 146, 52 Stat. 887, inapplicable to
§ 1325(a) (3)), rev'd on other grounds, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980) (analysis
should focus on extent of payments). Congress has recently indicated that the
good faith requirement was intended to retain its historical meaning as a measure of the debtor's purpose in seeking Chapter 13 relief. See note 109 infra.
12. See notes 49-78 infra.
13. See notes 101-11 infra.
14. See notes 91-100 infra.
15. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4) (Supp. I 1979) (requiring that a Chapter 13
plan must provide at least as much as unsecured creditors would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation). Presumably, a debtor will desire to repay his or her unsecured creditors in an amount consistent with his or her budget and income.
Thus, a Chapter 13 plan will often provide payments in excess of the minimum
prescribed by § 1325 (a) (4). See Craven, The Role of the Debtor's Attorney in
Chapter 13 (1980) (presented as a paper to the annual meeting of the National
Association of Chapter 13 Trustees at Williamsburg, Virginia on July 14, 1980).
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should be denied only if a plan is less than the debtor's best effort.
II. CHAPTER 13 AND THE REQUIREMENT
OF "GOOD FAITH"
A. CHAPTER XIII AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Wage earner plans that allow insolvent debtors to repay
creditors from future income were first developed by Special
Bankruptcy Referee Valentine Nesbitt in the early 1930s. 17
Nesbitt's experiments with wage earner plans formed the
model upon which Congress relied in adopting Chapter XIII in
the Chandler Act of 1938.18 Despite the congressional vision of
Chapter XIII as a desirable alternative to straight bankruptcy,
wage earner plans received a mixed reception from debtors and
the courts, being extensively utilized in some districts and virtually ignored in others.' 9 One commentator has suggested
that the uneven utilization of wage earner plans may have been
a result of the failure of the bankruptcy bar to achieve a "functional consensus ... as to whether Chapter XIII was designed

and intended by Congress to serve as a vehicle for debtor relief
and rehabilitation or as a collection device for creditors." 2 0
Despite this uncertainty regarding the goals of wage earner
17. See Cyr, Setting the Record Straightfor a Comprehensive Revision of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 Am.BANK. L.J. 99, 115-16 (1975).
18. Id. at 116.
19. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 1, at 74. That study indicated that,
although 76% of all debtors filing for bankruptcy relief in the Northern District
of Alabama chose Chapter XII, only 17% of all bankruptcies nationwide were
fied under that Chapter. The low percentage of Chapter XIII filings nationwide is attributable in part to the inclusion in the survey sample of business
debtors who could not fie wage earner plans. Nevertheless, another bankruptcy study noted, '"There are ... districts ... in which the records do not
disclose any, or more than a handful of, Chapter XIII petitions filed in any year
since 1938." CoamnssioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 157, reprinted in 2 app. W.
CoLUEt, supra note 1, at 1-157.
20. Cyr, supra note 17, at 117 (footnotes omitted). Judge Cyr noted that,
[t]he Chandler Act of 1938 failed badly in its attempt to identify, select
and order the priority of the public policy objectives of Chapter XI.
Critical provisions affecting Chapter XII were hastily put together in
the waning hours prior to its enactment, with the result that they were
modeled on the inapposite provisions of the arrangement and reorganization sections of Chapters X and XI
Id.
Many bankruptcy attorneys and referees counseled debtors against the use
of Chapter XIII in the belief that the administration of the debtor's plan would
prove to be unduly burdensome. See BRoonmGs REPORT, supra note 1, at 75-76;
CoMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 157-58, reprinted in 2 app. W. CoLLIER,
supra note 1, at 1-157 to -158.
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plans, Chapter XI in practice resulted in substantial repayment of creditors' claims: under completed plans, creditors received, on the average, over 90% of their allowed claims, and in
cases that were dismissed prior to completion, secured creditors recovered 39% and unsecured creditors recovered 19% of
their allowed claims. 21 The emphasis on substantial repay-

ment, however, influenced many debtors to undertake a higher
percentage of repayment than was practicable-over half of all
Chapter XII plans were dismissed prior to completion-leaving Chapter XHI's potential for debtor rehabilitation largely unfulflled.22 The rehabilitative value of old Chapter XII also
seems doubtful given the significant number of debtors who re23
sorted to it more than once.

Acknowledging these shortcomings, Congress substantially
revised Chapter XIII in 1978 to encourage more debtors to attempt repayment rather than liquidation. 24 Congress liberalized the Chapter 13 eligibility criteria, 25 eliminated the
21. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 1, at 102. See also Boren & Ralston,
Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans: An Analysis of Their Effectiveness, 15 Am.
Bus. L.J. 293, 304 (1977). Although Chapter XIII, like present Chapter 13, al-

lowed both extension and composition of debts, "[ilt is... probable that referees, Chapter XII trustees, and attorneys ... discouraged debtors from seeking
relief by way of composition unless at least 50% or more of the petitioner's
debts [could] be paid within the customary three-year period and without an

undue burden on the debtor." CobMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 161, re-

printed in 2 app. W. COLLER, supra note 1, at 1-161. This observation accounts
for the substantial repayment of creditors' claims under Chapter XIII and suggests that if a debtor could not substantially repay his creditors, Chapter XII
was regarded as inappropriate.
22. See BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 1, at 101; Boren & Ralston, supra
note 21, at 300.
23. See BROOKWnGs REPORT, supra note 1, at 104-05. Overall, 23% of Chap-

ter XII debtors had previous experiences in bankruptcy. Id.
24. The "proposed Chapter 13 encourages more debtors to repay their
debts over an extended period rather than to opt for straight bankruptcy liquidation and discharge." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5966 (footnote omitted). See also BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 210-12; CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 1314, reprintedin 2 app. W. COLLmR, supra note 1, at 1-13 to -14; S. ENZER, supra

note 1, at 10, 71.
25. Under the old Act, Chapter X=I was available only to individuals
whose "principal income" was "derived from wages, salary, or commissions."
Chandler Act, ch. 525, § 606(8), 52 Stat. 930 (1938). In contrast, Chapter 13 eligibility is limited to individuals with "noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts
of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$350,000." 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. m 1979).
Any "individual with regular income" is eligible to fie a Chapter 13 plan.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(24), 109(e) (Supp. I 1979). This definition of eligibility
embraces not only wage earners, but also pensioners, social security recipients,
and the self-employed. See Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 Am. BANKR.
L.J. 303, 304 (1979). See also In re Iacovoni, 2 B.I 256, 259-60 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah
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requirement that creditors vote their approval of each plan,26
and expanded the scope of the Chapter 13 discharge. 2 7 Because the new Code does not require any minimum percentage
of repayment, these modifications make it possible for debtors
to submit wage earner plans that would discharge obligations
with little or no payment of unsecured claims. 28 In addition,
debtors can now seek to discharge debts not dischargeable in
straight bankruptcy 2 9 by proposing nominal or zero payment to
unsecured creditors.
Neither the statute nor its legislative history expressly addresses the propriety of this unprecedented use of Chapter
13.30 Section 1325(a) of the Code provides that "[tihe court
shall confirm a plan" if six tests are satisfied, 31 the most important of which require that the plan be proposed in "good
33
faith,"32 that it be in the best interest of unsecured creditors,
and that the debtor have sufficient resources to make all the
1980) (welfare recipients qualify for Chapter 13 relief). Because the new Code
is not concerned with the source of income, but instead with the debtor's ability to repay creditors, Chapter 13 eligibility seems likely to include individuals
receiving alimony or whose income is derived from property. See H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 24, at 118, reprinted in [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 607980. Not all sole proprietors and self-employed professionals, however, may ifie
under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (Supp. MI 1979) (denying eligibility
to stock and commodity brokers).
26. Under old Chapter X=I, all secured creditors and a majority of unsecured creditors were required to have accepted the plan before a debtor
could apply for confirmation. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 652(1), 52 Stat. 934 (1938).
Under new Chapter 13, unsecured creditors are given no opportunity to vote on
the plan; their interests are protected by the "best interest of the creditors"
test. See note 4 supra.
27. Former Chapter XII excepted from discharge back taxes, debts obtained by means of fraud or embezzlement, debts not scheduled under the
plan, debts for intentional torts, student loans, back wages, alimony, and child
support. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550, as amended by
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 660, 52 Stat. 935 (1938). The new Code provides a discharge from all debts scheduled under the plan except alimony, child support,
and long term obligations "on which the last payment is due after the final payment of the plan is due." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a) (2), 523(a) (5) (Supp. I 1979).
28. There appears to be a trend toward zero or nominal payment Chapter
13 plans that would not have arisen under the former Act because of the creditor approval requirement. See, e.g., In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 559 (Bkrtcy. W.D.
Mich. 1980) (statistics indicating that the number of nominal payment Chapter
13 plans filed had increased markedly since the enactment of the new Code).
29. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. III 1979) with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(Supp. I 1979).
30. See note 11 supra.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Supp. I 1979).
32. Id. at § 1325(a)(3).
33. The so-called "best interest of the creditors" test is derived from
§ 1325 (a) (4). That section provides that unsecured creditors must receive at
least as much as they would realize from a Chapter 7 liquidation. See note 4
supra.
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payments required under the plan.3 4 Because nominal payment plans can often comply with these requirements, courts
have found it difficult to develop principled criteria for confirmig or denying confirmation to these plans. In an apparent attempt to force nominal payment plans into the mold of the
substantial repayment that was typical under former Chapter
XI, some courts have seized upon the good faith requirement,
35
interpreting it to require rejection of nominal payment plans.
A clear, consistent standard of "good faith," however, has yet to
emerge.

B. JuDiciLL TREATMENT OF THE GOOD FArrH REQUIREMENT
In re Iacovoni3 6 is the leading case construing "good faith"
to deny confirmation of Chapter 13 plans that propose zero or
nominal repayment of unsecured claims. In lacovoni, the
bankruptcy court ruled on eight wage earner plans that proposed to pay little or nothing to unsecured creditors whose
claims ranged in total amount from $3,233 to over $17,000.37 All
of the debtors apparently were capable of making some repayment to unsecured creditors in excess of the proposed
amounts.3 8 The court refused to confirm any of the eight plans,
holding that "good faith" means that debtors must "make
meaningful payment to holders of unsecured claims."3 9
Relying on the'express terms, the legislative history, and
the overall structure of the new Code,40 the court reasoned that
Chapter 13 was intended to serve "as a vehicle for the voluntary repayment of debts,"41 and thus, that "the plan must propose a legitimate or substantial repayment of unsecured
claims." 42 Recognizing that interpreting "good faith" to require
34. Id. at § 1325(a)(6).
35. See, e.g., In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360, 363-64 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Cal. 1980).
36. 2 B.R. 256, 258-59 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1980).
37. See id.

38. One debtor's monthly budget indicated an excess of gross income over
expenses of $76.16, but he proposed payments of only $11.96, to be distributed
between one secured creditor and the trustee. The budget of another debtor
showed $101.16 in surplus monthly income, but he proposed to pay a total of
only $21.52 under the plan. Id.
39. Id. at 267. One might argue that this remark is dictum and that the
narrow holding of Iacovoni was simply that under the facts, debtors' zero payment plans were not proposed in "good faith." Such an argument ignores the
intellectual thrust of the opinion, however, which converges with the court's
conclusion that "good faith" requires "meaningful payment." Accord, In re

Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 558 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich. 1980).
40. See 2 B.R. at 262-65.
41. Id. at 263 (emphasis omitted).

42. Id. at 267.
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"meaningful payment" provides little guidance to debtors, the
court promulgated a four-point test that makes the question of
whether the proposed payment is "meaningful" contingent
upon:
1.

The budget of the debtor, i.e., how much the debtor feasibly can
pay.
2. The future income and payment prospects of the debtor.
3. The dollar amount of debts outstanding, and the proposed percentage of repayment.
4. The nature of the debts sought to be discharged; specifically, to
what extent the debtor is invoking the advantage of the broader
Chapter 13 discharge which may carry
with it concomitant obliga43
tions of [greater] repayment effort.

The court emphasized that evaluation of the debtors' plans
must be made "equitably and flexibly."44
Considered in conjunction with the facts in lacovoni, these
four factors suggest several alternative formulations of the
good faith standard. First, the Jacovoni court's conclusion that
Chapter 13 was intended as a vehicle for voluntary repayment
of unsecured creditors and its holding that "meaningful payment" is required, imply that "good faith" mandates some minimum repayment to unsecured creditors. In short, zero or
nominal payment to such creditors would not be in "good
faith." The second possible formulation of "good faith" is similar to the first, but would demand greater repayment when a
debtor proposes to discharge debts in Chapter 13 that are not
dischargeable in straight bankruptcy.45 A third formulation
would focus on the debtor's subjective intent or motivation. 46 A
final variation of the good faith standard would depend on
whether the debtor's plan represents his or her best effort to
repay unsecured creditors. 47
These four alternative formulations of the good faith standard also appear to varying degrees in the opinions of other
courts ruling on zero or nominal payment Chapter 13 plans.48
43.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

44. Id.
45. This formulation is suggested by the court's criticism of one debtor
who attempted to discharge otherwise nondischargeable student loans, and the
court's warning that "the broader Chapter 13 discharge may carry with it concomitant obligations of repayment effort." Id.
46. This formulation is implied by the court's admonishment of debtors
who ifie "only for the broader discharge." Id. at 263.
47. Although the Iacovoni court specifically mentioned the debtor's ability
to repay creditors and the percentage of proposed repayment in light of that
ability as factors to be considered in evaluating the "good faith" of the debtor's
plan, it rejected the "best effort" test, arguing that it was contrary to congressional intent. Id. at 267. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 49, 80, 83, 91, 96-99, 101-05 infra.
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These courts have had difficulty reaching a consistent, unambiguous construction of the good faith requirement, however,
and the precise holding of many cases is thus difficult to discern. Because of this difficulty, it is most useful to consider the
cases within the framework of the four "good faith" formulations implicit in lacovoni.
1. The Requirement of Minimum Repayment to Unsecured
Creditors
The interpretation of "good faith" that requires minimum
repayment to unsecured creditors is derived in part from the
legislative history of Chapter 13. Courts adopting this standard
emphasize that Congress envisioned that debtors would utilize
wage earner plans as a means of repaying creditors. 49 Indeed,
the Senate Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 provides:
The new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual with regular income to propose and have approved a reasonable plan for debt repayment based on that individual's exact circumstances. As in current

law, 100 percent payment plans will be encouraged.... It is also necessary to prevent chapter 13 plans from turning into mere offers of
composition plans under which payments would equal only the non-exempt assets of the debtor.50

The House Report contains similar language, noting that "[t] he
purpose of chapter 13 is to enable an individual.., to develop
and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts."1
The House Report recognized that although some cases may require full repayment, in others a debtor "may offer creditors a
52
percentage of their claims in full settlement."
Although this legislative history clearly shows that creditor
repayment is to be encouraged under Chapter 13, it does not indicate whether payments are required in all cases, nor does it
indicate what percentage should be deemed adequate. 53 It also
49. See, e.g., In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Burrell, 6
B.R. 360, 363-64 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Hobday, 4 B.R. 417, 419-21
(Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1980).
50. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5799.
51. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079.
52. Id.
53. The Senate Report does state that "[iut is ... necessary to prevent
chapter 13 plans from turning into mere offers of composition." S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprintedin [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5799. See text accompanying note 50 supra. It is clear from the context,
however, that the Senate was referring to the requirement that 70% repayment
be made under Chapter 13 to qualify within six years for relief in straight bank-
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fails to address the role "good faith" will play in evaluating a
debtor's proposed payments to unsecured creditors. The absence of legislative expression on these questions is significant
because the Code itself imposes no minimum percentage of repayment. Some courts nevertheless maintain that the available
legislative history, and the repeated references to "payment" in
the Code itself, imply that a plan must provide some non-nomi54
nal payment on all allowed claims.
Courts requiring minimum repayment also assert that the
structure of the new Code demands some compulsory level of
payment to unsecured creditors under Chapter 13. As the
Jacovoni court argued, Congress's decision to eliminate the
55
creditor payment demand left Chapter 13 "out of balance."
6
Similarly, the court in In re Burrell5 contended that
[h]aving eliminated the creditor's veto right .... Congress cannot

lightly be held to have removed the major remaining protection accorded to these creditors, that is, the requirement of full or substantial
payment. If Congress had intended to abolish the substantiality reit did not,
quirement, it could have done so unambiguously. Because
57
this Court must conclude that no change was intended.

This structural argument includes the observation that the
Chapter 13 hardship discharge provision 58 would be rendered
superfluous if zero payment plans were allowed-such plans
would be "completed" before they were begun.5 9
1979), and was not implying that
ruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (9) (B) (Supp. MIr
a good faith requirement is an appropriate means of discouraging nominal payment Chapter 13 plans.
54. See, e.g., In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376, 378 (Bkrtcy. D.D.C. 1980); In re
Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 262 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(24), 109(e), 1325(a)(6), 1325(b),
1326 (Supp. I1 1979)). Sections 101(24) and 109(e) set forth the qualifications
for and definition of a Chapter 13 debtor. Because the qualifying debtor must
be an individual with "regular income," the lacovoni court concluded that this
requirement is intended only to allow debtors to make payments. 2 B-R. at 262.
Similarly, § 1325(a) (6) requires that the debtor be able to make "all payments
under the plan." Therefore, the court argued, the Code implies that payments
are required. Id. This conclusion is reinforced by the provision in § 1325(b)
that debtors distribute "all or any part" of their income under the plan. Finally,
the court reasoned that the title of § 1325--"Payments"--implies that some payment is required. Id. For a contrary analysis, see text accompanying notes 6176 infra.
55. 2 B.R. at 265.
56. 6 B.R. 360 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
57. Id. at 364.
58. The hardship discharge provision allows discharge prior to completion
of a plan in certain circumstances. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (Supp. MII1979).
59. See In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 262-63. Although the hardship discharge is
indeed not needed by debtors proposing zero payment plans, the hardship discharge is necessary to those debtors who can and do propose repayment of unsecured claims. The inclusion of the hardship discharge suggests that
Congress did not wish to penalize debtors for attempting to repay unsecured
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Other courts have not read the legislative history of Chap60
ter 13 to require payments to unsecured creditors in all cases.
6
In In re Cloutier, 1 for example, the court acknowledged that
"Congress contemplated that payments to creditors would be
made under Chapter 13," but observed that this payment objec62
tive could be satisfied by payments to secured creditors. Emphasizing that reduced payments to secured creditors are
allowed by the Chapter 13 "cram down" provision, 63 and that
debtors are able to schedule attorneys' fees and priority claims
under their plans,64 the court stated that "payments allowed by
the statute are obviously not limited to payments to unsecured
creditors." 65 The court concluded that there was no reason to
infer from language favoring payment generally that Congress
must have intended unsecured creditors always to be included.66 Moreover, the Cloutier court noted that a debtor
might desire to take full advantage of the broad Chapter 13 discharge while scheduling no payments to unsecured creditors,
and to the extent the plan pursued legitimate ends under the
Code, it would not be per se in bad faith.67
Another reason some courts have refused to require a
"good faith" minimum payment to unsecured creditors is that
section 1325(a) of the Code already requires that every plan be
found to be in the "best interest" of unsecured creditors. 68 In
practice, this means that unsecured creditors must be paid at
least as much as they would receive in a straight bankruptcy. 69
creditors when unforeseen financial setbacks render further performance
under the plan impossible. It does not follow, however, that the inclusion of
the hardship discharge precludes the possibility that debtors, in "good faith,"
may not be able to undertake any repayment of unsecured claims from the outset.
60. See notes 61, 67, 70-72 infra.
61. 3 B.R. 584 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980).
62. Id. at 585-86.
63. Id. at 586.
64. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2) (Supp. 1111979)).
65. Id. at 586.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 587. The court cited the desire to pay attorneys' fees under the
plan, cure a default on a home mortgage, or "cram down" secured creditors, as
examples of the legitimate ends in pursuance of which Chapter 13 may, in
"good faith," be invoked. "All of these activities further the 'fresh start' envisioned by Congress... ." Id. See also In re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34,35 (Bkrtcy. N.D.
Ill.
1980); In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123, 125-26 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1980). See Note, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH.
U. L. REV.843, 846-50 (1980) (development of the "fresh start" doctrine).
68. See note 4 supra.
69. Unsecured creditors, of course, would be paid nothing if the debtor's
assets are exempt
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Some courts thus argue that the "best interest of the creditors"
test establishes the only standard for evaluating the quantum
of proposed repayments to unsecured creditors. These courts
emphasize that the use of "good faith" to impose a higher standard for repayment is contrary to the principles of sound statutory construction and represents an improper exercise of
judicial prerogatives. 70 As one court remarked, although many
judges may consider zero payment plans to be unjust, "[a]
finding of 'good faith' should not be based exclusively on the
court's gastronomic reactions to the quantum received by [un7
secured] creditors, if the 'best interest' test has been met."'
A final consideration is that the use of -good faith" to require meaningful repayment to unsecured creditors "presages
nonuniform application of Chapter 13 because of differing judi72
cial attitudes as to what constitutes a 'good faith' proposal."
In other words, the inherently subjective evaluation of the
debtor's proposed percentage of repayment will lead to inconsistent and inequitable results. Two recent cases illustrate this
concern. A plan under which the debtor sought to cure a default on her home mortgage by proposing zero repayment was
confirmed in In re Bellgraph,73 while a debtor's one percent repayment plan was denied confirmation in In re Barnes7 4 despite the debtor's desire to use Chapter 13 to avoid eviction
from her home. Under both plans virtually all of the debtor's
resources were exhausted in payment of the claims of secured
creditors. In granting confirmation in Bellgraph, the court
noted that this was "an exceptional case" because the plan represented "a super effort by the debtor to pay her debts and
maintain her home." 75 In Barnes, however, despite the court's
70. See, e.g., In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 536-37 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Ark. 1980); In re
Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537, 538 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Ark. 1980).
71. In re Berry, 2 C.B.C.2d 663, 666 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1980).
72. In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. at 587. Accord, In re Harland, 3 B.R. 597, 599
(Bkrtcy. D. Neb. 1980).
73. 4 B.R. 421 (Bkrtcy. W.D.N.Y. 1980). In Bellgraph, the debtor, a 56 year
old divorced mother supporting one minor child, was disabled and living on a
limited income. Her property taxes were in arrears and a tax foreclosure proceeding had been instituted against her home. The debtor proposed a five year
plan under which the secured creditors would be paid in full. See also In re
Johnson, 6 B.R. 34, 35 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1980).
74. 5 B.R. 376 (Bkrtcy. D.D.C. 1980). The debtor in Barnes, a working
mother, supported two dependent children. The court noted that the debtor
faced "the risks of eviction and of repossession of her automobile if she [did]
not obtain relief under Chapter 13." Id. at 377.
75. 4 B.R. at 423-24. See also In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43, 45 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo.
1979) (nominal payment plan confirmed under what the court termed "exceptional circumstances").
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characterization of the debtor's circumstances as "compelling,"
the court refused to confirm because "a plan, in order to meet
the test of 'good faith,' must propose payments to unsecured
creditors." 76 Their own conflict notwithstanding, both decisions
leave unresolved the disposition of zero or nominal payment
plans in less than "exceptional" or "compelling" circumstances.
On balance, an interpretation of "good faith" that requires
some minimum repayment is unsound and unwarranted. Nothing in Chapter 13 or its legislative history mandates this result.7 7 Furthermore, such a rule substitutes the subjective,
unpredictable judgment of courts for the objective "best interest of the creditors" test already provided for unsecured creditors under section 1325(a) (4) of the Code. The gloss of
"meaningful" or "substantial" repayment that some courts
have added to "good faith" is vague and ambiguous and thus
undermines uniform administration of a good faith standard.7 8
2. Debts Not Dischargeablein Straight Bankruptcy and the
Good Faith Requirement
Some courts have found "good faith" lacking when debtors
seek to discharge obligations under a zero or nominal payment
79
plan that would not be dischargeable in straight bankruptcy.
One court, for example, denied confirmation of such a plan,
stating that "[wjhere otherwise nondischargeable debts are
provided for by the plan and will be discharged, a more significant percentage should be required." 80 Predicating this higher
76. 5 B.R. at 378.
77. See Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation; Its Statutory Requirements as
to Payment to and Classificationof Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20
WAsHBuRN L.J. 1, 13 (1980).
78. In In re Garcia, 6 B.P. 35, 38 (Bkrtcy. D. Kan. 1980) the court remarked

that it could
think of nothing more disheartening and furstrating to a debtor in this
type of proceeding than to be told that he or she has met the standards
expressly set forth in § 1325, has met an imputed requirement of best
effort but has failed an imputed and engrafted substantial or meaningful payment requirement. That person is then told to file a Chapter 7
proceeding or in some instances has had a plan converted to a Chapter
7 proceeding where nothing is paid to creditors. All the debtor wished
to do was his or her best. Would that all debtors appearing before this
Court did.
Id.
79. See notes 4, 29 supra.
80. In re Cook, 3 B. 480, 486 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va. 1980). In Cook, the
debtor was barred from filing in Chapter 7 by 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. III
1979), which establishes a six year bar for debtors filing in straight bankruptcy
after a prior Chapter 7 discharge. The court suggested that a "sliding scale"
should be employed in assessing the "good faith" of a Chapter 13 plan seeking
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repayment requirement on "good faith," the court observed
that "[a] 'good faith' plan is the price exacted by Chapter 13 for
its more generous relief."81 Other courts have echoed this concern, holding that zero or nominal payment Chapter 13 plans
may not be employed in "good faith" to discharge tort debts82
or other debts excepted from Chapter 7.83 Courts that have refused to confirm these plans have generally relied on the interpretation of Chapter 13 employed in the other minimum
repayment cases, arguing that a minimum percentage of repay84
ment to unsecured creditors should be required in all cases.
Other courts have rejected this approach, declining to impose any extraordinary repayment requirement for Chapter 13
plans that propose discharge of otherwise nondischargeable
debts. 85 Courts that refuse to treat these plans differently from
plans in which no Chapter 7 dischargeability problems are evident emphasize that Congress expressly provided for the
broader Chapter 13 discharge. This "plain meaning" approach
stresses that "Congress surely was aware that Chapter 13
would make certain persons eligible for discharge of certain
debts that would be nondischargeable debts under Chapter
7."86 Thus "it is not bad faith to utilize the liberal discharge
provisions of Chapter 13."87 These courts conclude that a
sound construction of the Chapter 13 discharge provisions is a
literal one that should not include the use of "good faith" to require higher repayment standards for debts not dischargeable

in Chapter

7.88

to discharge debts barred from discharge by the six year rule. Thus, "when the
time since a prior discharge is relatively short, the percentage proposed for
creditors should be higher." 3 B.R. at 486.
81. 3 B.R. at 484.
82. See, e.g., In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va. 1980) (debtor proposed to pay in full a creditor holding a fully secured lien on the debtor's truck
but offered nothing to unsecured creditors, one of whom held a tort judgment
against the debtor).
83. See generally In re Bloom, 3 B.& 467, 467 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1980)
("substantial question of dischargeability of some of the major debts" scheduled for discharge under the three plans that were consolidated for consideration at a confirmation hearing).
84. See, e.g., In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480, 482-84 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
85. See generally In re Seely, 6 B.&. 309 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Va. 1980); In re
Koeperich, 5 B.L 752 (Bkrtcy. D. Neb. 1980); In re McBride, 4 B.RL 389 (Bkrtcy.
M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Jenkins, 4 B.L 278 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980); In re Keckler, 3
B.R. 155 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1980).
86. In re Keckler, 3 B.R. 155, 159 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1980).
87. In re Seely, 6 B.R. 309, 313 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Va. 1980).
88. See, e.g., In re Koeperich, 5 B.R. 752, 755 (Bkrtcy. D. Neb. 1980) ("Section 1328(a) specifically allows a debtor to discharge debts which could not be
discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding; the more general good faith requirement
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Those decisions that have imposed a higher repayment
standard in nondischargeability cases seem flawed because
they confuse the determination of "good faith" with the legal
status of the debts scheduled for discharge. This construction
of "good faith" is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
statute and is unsupported by any legislative history. Moreover, framing the "good faith" issue in terms of the debtor's attempt to obtain the broad Chapter 13 discharge obscures other
aspects of the case that more reasonably bear on the presence
or absence of the debtor's "good faith."89
Any prospective remedy of the discharge disparity should
be left to Congress. In response to the judiciary's concerns,
Congress might amend the Code to eliminate the disparity in
the discharge under Chapters 7 and 13. Other incentives to the
use of Chapter 13, such as the "cram down" provision and the
ability to cure defaults under the plan, would remain to encourage the continued use of Chapter 13. Until such amendments are enacted, however, the courts should refrain from the
use of "good faith" to impose higher repayment standards in
nondischargeability cases. 90
cannot be used to amend § 1328(a) to suit the tastes of creditors or courts."); In
re Jenkins, 4 B.R. 278, 279-80 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980) (concluding that since

"[t]he treatment of creditors is a matter of legislative policy and not a subject

of judicial concern," the literal reading of Chapter 13 requirements is warranted). The confirmation of Chapter 13 plans that schedule otherwise nondischargeable debts is consistent with the legislative history of the new Code. See
CObMUSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 163, reprintedin 2 app. W. CoLmR, upra
note 1, at 1-163 ("the fact that a debtor may not be eligible for a discharge in
straight bankruptcy should not prevent confirmation of a plan of payment from

future earnings").

89. See In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305, 307 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1980) ("[TIhe ultimate question is not whether the debt is non-dischargeable, but whether the

plan is filed in good faith.").

90. Persuasive arguments can be made in support of the retention of the
present discharge scheme. Commenting on the need to eliminate the overly restrictive exceptions to discharge under the old Act, the Brookings Report sug-

gested:
Where the intent of such exceptions is to punish the debtor for his conduct (as to fraud or sexual irregularities), there are more appropriate
sanctions and penalties available elsewhere in the laws. Where the intent is to prefer certain types of claims (as for taxes and wages), we
submit that such provisions negate the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings. If an arrangement was feasible, these debts would be paid
along with others. If the debtor's situation required a... bankruptcy
discharge, his 'fresh start" would be impeded by the existence of such
claims.
BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 1, at 208. See also In re Keckler, 3 B.R. 155, 159
(Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1980). But see Hughes, Chapter13's Potentialfor Abuse, 58
N.C. L. REV. 829, 847-48 (1980).
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The Debtor's Subjective Intent or Motivation as the Measure
of "Good Faith"
A number of courts have suggested that an important fac-

tor in determining whether a plan is in "good faith" is the
debtor's subjective intent or motivation in seeking Chapter 13
relief.9 1 Evaluation of subjective intent has been of particular
concern in the nondischargeability cases. As one court has observed,
[i]f its real motive and purpose is to obtain a discharge of the debts
*

.

. and if the true purpose of attaching the label "Chapter 13" to the

case is to evade the discharge limitations in a Chapter
7 case, the court
92
should recognize the case for what it is, an illusion.

The same court noted that under prior Chapter XII, the "dishonest" debtor was barred from participation in a wage earner

plan, 93 and that the congressional revisions to Chapter XIII,

particularly the elimination of the creditors' vote, altered Chapter 13 so that "the dishonest debtor ... is now eligible for
Chapter 13" relief. 94 The court therefore invoked "good faith"
as a hedge against the use of Chapter 13 for "dishonest" purposes.95
Other courts have forthrightly asserted that the debtor's
subjective intent in utilizing Chapter 13 is the measure of the
"good faith" of the plan.96 Unfortunately this characterization
adds little specificity to the good faith standard. Moreover, the

inherent difficulty in assessing a debtor's subjective intent may
lead courts to reach contrary results in cases involving substan91. See, e.g., In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 555 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich. 1980); In re
Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 472 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1980).
92. In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 472 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1980).
93. Id. at 469. See also In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 555 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich.
1980).
94. In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 469 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1980).
95. Id. at 470-71. See also In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 350 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va.
1980); In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480, 481 (Bkrtcy S.D. W.Va. 1980) (debtors admitted
that their reason for filing Chapter 13 was to discharge debts not dischargeable
under Chapter 7 and confirmation was denied).
96. See In re Seely, 6 B.R. 309, 312, 313 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Va. 1980) ("good faith"
is a "subjective thing"); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 351 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va. 1980)
("[in the instant case, 'good faith' is subjectively lacking"). After reviewing
the treatment of "good faith" under the old Bankruptcy Act, the Seely Court
declared that
it appears the Courts are concerned with maintaining the integrity of
the system vis-a-vis the unscrupulous debtor. So long as the petition is
filed with the intent to utilize the Act to obtain relief in a legitimate
fashion, good faith will exist. It is lacking when a debtor attempts to
manipulate the statutory scheme for his own benefit at the expense of
his creditors.
6 B.R. at 313. The court concluded that the definition of "good faith" under the
Act retained viability under the Code. Id.
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tially similar fact patterns. Nevertheless, those unusual cases
involving particularly egregious examples of debtor abuse of
Chapter 13 might properly be decided under the subjective definition of "good faith." In one case, for example, the debtor defrauded his creditors and attempted to discharge the tainted
debts in Chapter 13;97 in another, debtors filed in Chapter 13
98
In
with no apparent desire to attempt creditor repayment.
these cases some courts have identified impermissible subjective intent as abuse of the "provisions, purposes, or spirit of
Chapter 13."99 Although less sharply defined abuses of Chapter
13 will inevitably present courts with difficult decisions, subjective intent is nonetheless a plausible definition of the good faith
standard and recent developments in Congress suggest that
courts should continue to employ this formulation, at least
when its application can be clear and consistent.oo
4. "Good Faith"Requires the Debtor's "Best Effort" to Repay
Unsecured Creditors
Many of the opinions ruling on zero or nominal payment
Chapter 13 plans have alluded to a "best effort" test for evaluating the debtor's "good faith."O1 Under this formulation of the
97. In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339, 340 (Bkrtcy. D. Col. 1980) ("to confirm this plan
would, in effect, make the bankruptcy court the Debtor's instrument for perpetrating fraud").
98. In re Burns, 6 B.RL 286 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980) (debtors' duplicity, inferred from their failure to schedule some creditors under an old Chapter XIII
plan while making full payment to other creditors, was grounds for not confirming Chapter 13 plan).
99. In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339, 340 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980); In re Burns, 6 B.L
286, 288 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980). See also In re Cloutier, 3 B.R at 587.
100. See note 109 infra. As a corollary to the formulation of subjective
"good faith," courts have also found "good faith" lacking when a debtor's plan
would serve no rehabilitative purpose. In In re Lockwood, 5 B.R 294 (Bkrtcy.
S.D. Fla. 1980), the Lockwoods filed in Chapter 13 in order to avoid a deficiency
judgment on their home mortgage. As of the date of the filing of the petition,
the house had been sold to their attorney. The court observed.
The plan fails to comply with the good faith requirement of
§ 1325(a) (3) in that the plan does not provide any rehabilitation of the
debtors. They, in effect, had lost their real property prior to the filing of
these proceedings and are not being reinstated in ownership or possession, since, as part of the plan, they have agreed to transfer their interest in the real property to their attorney. Their consumer debts have
not been dealt with in any manner whatsoever under the plan, leaving
them absolutely no better off than they were before the jurisdiction of
this court was invoked. The debtors have been persuaded to opt for an
illusory benefit, while the only real benefit goes to the new purchaser.
Id. at 297.
101. As one court stated, "[i]n determining whether a debtor's Chapter 13
plan has been proposed in good faith it must necessarily be of paramount importance whether the payments, periodic and total, represent the best effort
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good faith standard, a plan must provide for payment of a substantial amount of the excess of a debtor's net monthly income
over reasonable, budgeted expenses. In re Anderson 0 2 perhaps best illustrates the application of the best effort standard.
The Anderson court denied confirmation of a plan scheduled to
run fifteen months that would have repaid unsecured creditors
one percent of their allowed claims. The court noted that the
debtors "admitted that they could afford to make the monthly
payments ... for a period longer than fifteen months, but did

not intend to do

'
so. 103

The court elaborated:

[If. .. a debtor is to avoid bankruptcy and gain the benefits of Chapter 13, the quid pro quo is that he should pay according to his ability
and circumstances, thereby providing fairly and responsibly for his
creditors within the spirit of Chapter 13. That is what the "good faith"
requirement demands. That element is one which the Court must consider on a case by case basis since the circumstances and abilities of
each debtor will differ. 10 4

Thus, in the court's estimation, the debtors' plan failed to satisfy the good faith requirement, not because the plan proposed
only nominal payments to unsecured creditors, but because the
debtors could afford to make larger payments and chose not to
do so. 0 5
Although courts have consistently refused to confirm plans
which the debtor can apply against the scheduled indebtedness." In re Marlow,
3 B.R. 305, 308 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1980) (emphasis added). In In re Cook, 3 B.R.
480 (Bkrtcy. S.D. W. Va. 1980), the court implicitly raised the best effort test,
noting that the Chapter 13 repayment standard to be employed by courts
should encourage debtors to repay unsecured creditors as much as their budgets will allow. Id. at 485-86. See also In re White, 4 B.R. 349, 350 (Bkrtcy. E.D.
Va. 1980).
102. 3 B.R. 160 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1980).
103. Id. at 162.
104. Id. at 163.
105. Accord, In re Henry, 4 B.R. 220 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (debtor's 10%
repayment plan not confirmed because the debtor failed to demonstrate why
payments could not continue after four months); In re Schongalla, 4 B.R. 360
(Bkrtcy. D. Mo. 1980) (budget surplus after monthly payment to creditors along
with impending legal career indicated plan did not deal fairly with creditors).
The Anderson line of cases seems to suggest that a debtor's bad faith might be
remedied by increasing either the duration or the dollar amount of repayments
under the plan. Although one court has suggested this tactic as a means of establishing a debtor's "good faith", another court has unequivocably rejected a
proposed extension of the scheduled payment period. Compare In re
Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748, 752 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mich. 1980) (suggesting that a 36 month
plan be extended to 60 months) with In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123, 125 (Bkrtcy. M.D.
Tenn. 1980) (stating that "[tlhis court cannot conclude that a plan otherwise
non-confirmable under § 1325 can be made confirmable by an extension from 3
to 5 years"). Neither Moss nor Blackwell, however, involved plans in which the
payments were scheduled for a period less than three years. In a case in which
payments were scheduled for significantly less than three years, additional
payments might very well satisfy the Anderson definition of "good faith."
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that represent less than the debtor's best effort, the cases have
been divided regarding confirmation of nominal payment plans
that do satisfy the best effort test. One court declined to confirm the debtor's one percent plan despite its acknowledgment
that the plan was the debtor's best effort, but noted that "such
a commitment ... should be given great weight in favor of the
debtor's proposal."106 On the other hand, courts have confirmed one percent plans where "the debtor is paying all available funds to the plan," reasoning that "the debtor cannot be
required to pay more money than he has into a Chapter 13
07
plan."l

Recognizing the validity of the best effort test as a factor in
assessing the debtor's "good faith," other courts have nonetheless refused to equate "good faith" with "best effort" because
section 1325(a) of the Code does not expressly incorporate a

best effort criterion.108 Because Congress could have included

the best effort requirement in section 1325(a) but did not do so,

courts using this approach conclude that "good faith" must
mean something other than "best effort." This argument overlooks, however, the attempt of the Ninety-Sixth Congress to
amend section 1325(a) to require some form of the best effort

test.109 Although this legislation has not yet been enacted, the
106. In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337, 341 n.2 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1980). The debtor's
sole income in Beaver was $580 in monthly unemployment compensation. Out
of that amount she supported two young children and proposed to repay unsecured creditors a total of $32.06 with an additional $223.00 scheduled to be
paid to her attorney and the Chapter 13 trustee over a course of five months.
The court observed that this amount was "the best effort that could be expected of someone in Miss Beaver's circumstances." Id. at 341. See also In re
Barnes, 5 B.R. 376, 378 (Bkrtcy. D.D.C. 1980).
107. In re Moss, 5 B.I 123, 125 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1980). See also In re
Bellgraph, 4 B.R. 421, 423-24 (Bkrtcy. W.D.N.Y. 1980) (confirmed one percent
plan was a "super effort"). Another court, while declining to require the
debtor's best effort, confirmed a debtor's zero percent plan noting that the payments were indeed the debtor's best effort. In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611, 613 (Bkrtcy.
M.D. Ala. 1980).
108. See, e.g., In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 267. See also In re Ward, 6 B.R. 93, 96
(Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1980) ("contrary to some beliefs 'good faith' was not
designed by Congress to be synonomous or a substitute for the term 'best effort' ").
109. The 96th Congress sought to clarify and correct oversights and ambiguities in the new Code as part of a Technical Amendments Bill to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill
passed their respective chambers in December of 1980, 126 CONG. REc. S15,176
(daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980); 126 CONG. Rzc. H16,140 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), but the
legislation was ultimately not enacted. The final versions of both the House
and the Senate bills, however, contained the same proposed amendments to
the section 1325(a) confirmation standards. The bills would have amended section 1325 (a) (4) to include a requirement that a Chapter 13 plan "represents the
debtor's bona fide effort." S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b), 126 CONG. REC.
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congressional attempt to incorporate a best effort standard sugS15,170 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980); H. 779, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 127(b), 126 CONG.
REC. H11,753 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
In addition to proposing the bona fide effort requirement, both versions of
the bill addressed the good faith requirement of section 1325(a) (3). The original version of S. 658 would have amended section 1325(a) (3) by adding a requirement that the plan be "the debtor's best effort." S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 188, 125 CONG. REc. S12,178 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979). The bill was sent to
the House, which changed the "best effort" language to a requirement that the
plan "represents the debtor's good faith effort." H. 779, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 128(b), 126 CONG. REC. H9,299 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980). When the House returned the bill to the Senate, the Senate deleted all amendments to section
1325(a) (3) and added the bona fide effort requirement to section 1325(a)(4).
S.658, 96th Cong.,,2d Sess. § 128(b), 126 CONG. REC. S15,170 (daily ed. Dec. 1,
1980). This final version of the Senate bill was returned to the House, where it
was passed with the changes to section 1325(a) proposed by the Senate, 11779,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 127(b), 126 CONG. REc. H11,735 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
Despite other differences, the final versions of both bills contained the same requirements for the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans.
The two chambers differed, however, on what was meant by "bona fide effort." The report of the floor debate in the Senate indicates that "a significant
percentage, if not all" of a debtor's unsecured obligations must be repaid under
the plan in order to establish the bona fides of the debtor's repayment effort.
126 CONG. REC. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). Although the proponents in the Senate suggested that the "'bona fide effort' test
is intended to require that the plan proposed by the debtor is a real effort...
to repay his creditors," they conclude that "[njo arbitrary repayment levels
should be required by judges." Id. On the question of the validity of zero or
nominal payment plans, the Senate record states that Chapter 7, rather than
Chapter 13, is the appropriate remedy for "the debtor who simply [has] no
present or foreseeable prospects of paying his debts at all" Id.
The Report of the House Judiciary Committee presents a very different
characterization of the repayment levels required by Chapter 13. See H.R. REP.
No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1980). The House Report stated that "a
chapter 13 debtor ... should present a plan which demonstrates his willingness to satisfy the just claims of creditors through bona fide efforts to make
payments reasonably commensurate with his ability to do so in the circumstances." Id. at 25. Agreeing with the Senate that "subsection 1325(a)(3), as
amended, neither prescribes nor authorizes the imposition by the court of a requirement that a chapter 13 plan propose any arbitrary minimum percentage"
of repayment to unsecured creditors, the report continued, "the circumstances
of a given case may require that the court confirm a chapter 13 plan which proposes no dividend whatever to holders of allowed unsecured claims or that the
court deny confirmation of a plan proposing a 95% dividend." Id. (emphasis
added).
The House Judiciary Committee Report was issued in reference to the first
version of H. 779, see 126 CONG. Rnc. H9,299 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980), which proposed the amendment of § 1325(a) (3)to include the "good faith effort" test.
The Senate debate, however, addressed the version of the bill in which the
"bona fide effort" amendment to § 1325(a) (4) had been substituted for the
§ 1325(a) (3) "good faith effort" test. See 126 CONG. Rzc. S15,170 (daily ed. Dec.
3, 1980). Further confusing the issue of congressional intent, is language in the
floor debate accompanying the passage of the final version of H. 779. Congressman Edwards stated that despite "slight differences between the language" in
the Sept. 22 and Dec. 3 versions of the bill, H.779, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. Rzc. H9,290-304 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980); H.779, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REc. H11,725-40 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), the Judiciary Committee Report
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gests that the best effort test was contemplated by Congress as
part of the Chapter 13 confirmation criteria. 1 10
Despite the uncertainty of some courts over the validity of
a best effort standard, this characterization of the good faith requirement offers several advantages. First, the best effort standard can be consistently applied-whenever the debtor's plan
represents his or her best effort to repay unsecured creditors,
regardless of the proposed percentage of repayment, the plan
would be confirmed. Courts need not resort to divining subjective intent or to applying an ill-defined, variable requirement of

minimum repayment. Second, the best effort test is an objective measure of "good faith." The debtor, the creditors, and the
court can assess the "good faith" of a plan by simple arithmetic
once evidence is adduced detailing the debtor's monthly income and expenses. Third, the best effort standard encourages
payments to creditors, as contemplated by Congress, to the
greatest extent practicable. Finally, a best effort formulation of
"good faith" can be more equitably administered. Under this
standard, financially distressed debtors will not be denied
Chapter 13 relief because they are unable to offer "meaningful"
payments to unsecured creditors."'
was still applicable. 126 CONG. REc. H11,740 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Edwards). Congressman Edwards continued, "this should be true also
where the differences are merely with regard to the location of the subject matter dealt with." Id. Thus, the House and Senate were apparently as divided as
are the courts with respect to the confirmation of zero or nominal payment
Chapter 13 plans.
Nevertheless, both Houses agreed that "good faith" was not intended to require a minimum percentage of repayment to unsecured creditors. Instead, the
good faith requirement was meant to "bar the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
where the debtor either does not intend to effectuate the plan as proposed or
where the proposed plan if consummated, would contravene the spirit or purpose of Chapter 13." H.R. REP. No. 1195, supra, at 24. Accord, 126 CONG. REc.
S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). Both houses cited
a plan whereby the debtor seeks to avoid "enforceable legal obligations for the
support and maintenance of a former spouse or dependent child," as an example of a plan proscribed by the good faith requirement. Id.
110. Had the Technical Amendments Bill been enacted, "good faith" would
indeed assume a meaning distinct from "best" or "bona fide" effort. Because
Congress has indicated that a debtor's best effort should be required in Chapter 13 cases, courts should endeavor to enforce the legislative will by construing
"good faith" to include a best effort standard.
111. Although the courts may differ on the relative austerity of the debtor's
budget necessary to demonstrate a reasonable repayment effort, this evaluation
is certainly no more arbitrary than the courts' current attempts to define "good
faith." In addition, the best effort standard can be applied in a more equitable
manner, because the reasonableness of the debtor's budget will only be at issue in cases in which the debtor's expenses appear to be excessive, as when
the debtor has budgeted extravagant amounts for entertainment or transportation. Debtors budgeting reasonable outlays for food, clothing, shelter, and med-
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A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF "GOOD FAITH"

The best effort standard presented above should be uniformly adopted as the primary criterion of "good faith" in
Chapter 13 proceedings. Such a standard is preferable both on
its merits and relative to the other formulations of "good faith"
that have been employed.
The best effort standard is capable of largely objective application. A debtor's income and necessary expenses are easily
demonstrable and the determination of "good faith" requires
only an examination of whether the excess of income over expenses is scheduled as fully as possible for repayment. In the
vast majority of Chapter 13 cases, there would be no need to attempt evaluation of the debtor's subjective "good faith." An assessment of the debtor's subjective intent may be necessary
only in extraordinary cases in which the debtor's plan, albeit
his or her best effort, abuses the "provisions, the purposes, or
the spirit of Chapter 13"--such as when the debtor does not intend to perform under an otherwise confirmable plan. 112 Subjective intent as a measure of "good faith" thus would retain
only an ancillary role in Chapter 13 confirmation proceedings.1 13
In addition to this ease of application, the best effort test
promotes the policies underlying Chapter 13 relief, including

equality of distribution among creditors, economical adminisical expenses should, therefore, experience little difficulty on this point. See
124 CONG. REC. H11,098 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978):
In determining whether a plan is the debtor's "best effort" prior to confirmation of a plan the court will evaluate several factors. Different
facts and circumstances in cases under Chapter 13 operate to make any
rule of thumb of limited usefulness. The court should balance the
debtor's assets, including family income, health insurance, retirement
benefits, and other wealth, a sum which is generally determinable,
against the foreseeable necessary living expenses, which unfortunately
is rarely quantifiable. In determining the expenses of the debtor and
the debtor's dependents, the court should consider the stability of the
debtor's employment, if any, the age of the debtor, the number of the
debtor's dependents and their ages, the condition of equipment and
tools necessary to the debtor's employment or to the operation of his
business, and other foreseeable expenses that the debtor will be required to pay during the period of the plan, other than payments to be
made to creditors under the plan.
Accord, id. at S17,415 (Oct. 6, 1978).
112. See notes 97-98 &upraand accompanying text.
113. It can be expected that in cases in which the debtor's plan reveals an
impermissible subjective intent, the plan will also fail to satisfy the best effort
test. See, e.g., In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339, 340-41 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 1980). Courts will
thus be able to deny confirmation to these plans without reaching the requirement of subjective "good faith."
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tration, and a "fresh start" for debtors.114 Denial of Chapter 13
confirmation under an unnecessarily restrictive good faith standard forces debtors to refile under Chapter 7,115 a result that
circumvents the policies underlying bankruptcy reform. Because the same priorities for distribution of the debtor's assets
apply to both Chapters 7 and 13, equality of distribution is accomplished under either chapter. 16 The costs of bankruptcy
administration, however, are increased by denying confirmation
of nominal payment plans. Historically, administrative expenses as a percentage of the debtor's assets were higher
under Chapter VII than under Chapter XII,"17 and in light of
the reforms incorporated into Chapter 13,118 this trend is likely
to continue. Moreover, the conversion of the debtor's Chapter
13 case to a Chapter 7 proceeding introduces additional administrative steps and thus further undermines this reform goal.11 9
Finally, the debtor's "fresh start" is promoted by the broader
discharge and redemption provisions of Chapter 13 relative to
Chapter 7. This fresh start is not limited to discharge of debts
and redemption of personal property; the broader goal of the
fresh start "is to rehabilitate debtors for continued and more
value-productive participation in the economy."1 20 The Chapter
13 plan, by requiring debtors to live within a highly structured
budget, is more likely to accomplish the debtor's rehabilitation
than is a liquidation under Chapter 7.121 The fresh start available under Chapter 13 also avoids the stigma of bankruptcy.22
Thus, the goals of Chapter 13 relief are better served by allowing nominal payment plans when they are debtors' best ef114. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 75, reprinted in 2 app. W. CoLuIE, supra note 1, at 1-75. See also S. ENZER, supra note 1, at 32.
115. Assuming that the debtor is not barred from obtaining Chapter 7 relief
by 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(a) (9) (B) (Supp. I 1979), an insolvent debtor will naturally seek relief in straight bankruptcy.
116. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 1326(a) (Supp. I 1979).
117. BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 1, at 178.
118. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
119. In addition, the debtor will probably incur additional attorney's fees associated with the conversion of the case. A hard-pressed debtor can ill afford to
assume any added demands on an already overstrained budget.
120. COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 71, reprinted in 2 app. W. CoLIJER, supra note 1, at 1-71.
121. It should be remembered that even in a case proposing zero payment
to unsecured creditors, the debtor will generally make payments to secured
creditors and thus subject himself to the discipline of a plan. But see BROOKmos REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-65 (noting that although a majority of straight
bankrupts had poor payment records on post-discharge debts, Chapter XIII
debtors did even worse).
122. See note 4 supra.
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fort than by disallowing such plans under a more restrictive
good faith standard.
The more consistent and predictable outcomes available
under the best effort test also resolve the current problem arising from the "substantial" or "meaningful" payment standards.
Because the latter approaches are inherently subject to variation between judges, debtors cannot predict whether their proposed payments will be deemed sufficient. In reaction to this
uncertainty, many debtors can be expected to opt for the assured resolution of their financial difficulties through a Chapter
7 liquidation. Chapter 7 deprives at least some unsecured creditors of the dividend they would realize under a Chapter 13
plan, and offers no commensurate benefit.123
The best effort standard also maximizes repayment of creditors: by definition, it requires that every reasonably available
dollar be applied to repayment and could never offer less repayment than would be realized from liquidation.
Finally, the economics of bankruptcy suggest that there is
no need to invoke a more restrictive definition of "good faith"
to protect the interests of unsecured creditors by requiring a
minimum repayment. Courts that require a minimum repayment misapprehend the impact of nominal payment plans on
the credit community. Unsecured creditors do not need judicial
protection from perceived abuses 'of Chapter 13 because creditors generally do not bear the burden of debts discharged in
bankruptcy. One scholar has noted that "[t]he evidence and
economic theory strongly support the proposition that any increase ...

in lending costs brought about by changes in the

bankruptcy law will in the long run be passed along to borrowers or potential borrowers."124 It has also been argued that
creditors can more effectively evaluate the risks and returns associated with a proposed transaction than the courts suppose.1 25 Indeed, the risk that credit will go bad is present in all
123. Although as the percentage of repayment of unsecured claims approaches zero the benefit to unsecured creditors is correspondingly diminished,
no creditor will be worse off under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7. See 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4) (Supp. HI 1979). The unsecured creditor holding a claim not
dischargeable in straight bankruptcy is the exception to this rule. The scheduling of otherwise nondischargeable debts is not sufficient grounds, however, to
deny confirmation to a debtor's Chapter 13 plan. See notes 79-89 supra and accompanying text.
124. Meckling, FinancialMarkets, Default and Bankrtupcy: The Role of the
State, 41 I & CoNiMP. PROB. 13, 21 (Autumn 1977).
125. Weston, Some Economic Fundamentalsfor an Analysis of Bankruptcy,
41 L. & CoNTrmeP. PRoB. 47, 60 (Autumn 1977). Another commentator has suggested, however, that the economic costs of zero or nominal payment plans will
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credit transactions; lenders anticipate bad debts and pass on
these costs to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates.
All of this suggests that there are no compelling equitable or
economic reasons to deny confirmation of nominal payment
plans in the name of creditor justice. Moreover, whether bad
debts are discharged under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 ultimately
should have little effect on the profitability of the credit business because even under a nominal payment plan, unsecured
creditors cannot receive less than they would in straight bankruptcy.
Thus, the best effort standard of "good faith" should be
adopted, requiring only that debtors make every reasonable effort to repay unsecured creditors within the constraints of their
income and expenses. If a debtor with limited income proposes
to make only nominal or even zero repayments to unsecured
creditors and these payments represent the debtor's best effort,
the plan should be confirmed regardless of the quantum of repayment proposed or the presence of debts that would not be
dischargeable in straight bankruptcy. Conversely, the courts
should deem a plan not in "good faith" when the debtor proposes to repay unsecured creditors in an amount significantly
less than the debtor's budget can accommodate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Code is an attractive alternative to straight bankruptcy. In contrast to repealed Chapter XIII, insolvent debtors can readily propose an extension
and composition of debts under the new Code. The relative
ease with which debts can be discharged under Chapter 13 has
prompted some debtors to propose plans that offer little or
nothing to unsecured creditors. These plans have run afoul of
many courts that consider zero or nominal repayment of unsecured creditors to be not in "good faith." Neither the Code
nor its legislative history mandates this conclusion and, in light
of the policies and economics of bankruptcy reform, courts are
not be evenly distributed among credit users, but "Will be allocated to less affluent groups." Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 L & CoNTrnip. PROB. 107,
118 (Autumn 1977). Charges that the confirmation of zero or nominal payment
plans will have an adverse and disproportionate impact on low income borrowers overlook debtors' ability to avoid consumer debts under Chapters 7 and 11
as well as under Chapter 13. Debts discharged under any chapter of the Code
are losses to creditors that potentially will be passed on to borrowers in the

form of higher interest rates or restrictive lending practices. The bankruptcy

system as a whole, and not simply the Chapter 13 good faith requirement, is
implicated by this argument.
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mistaken in holding that "good faith" requires "substantial" or
"meaningful" payment of unsecured claims. Because of the
Code's other provisions to protect creditors and because of the
legislative history and policy behind the reforms of Chapter 13,
"good faith" should be interpreted to require only that the
debtor's plan represent his or her best efforts to satisfy the
claims of unsecured creditors. Plans conforming to this standard, regardless of the amount of the proposed repayment,
would satisfy the good faith requirement and should be confirmed if they otherwise comply with Chapter 13 rules.

